Abstract. When random numbers are needed, kernel level threads can use at least one of two random number generators (RNGs), called LRNG and MD5 PRNG. LRNG is a well-known cryptographic RNG accessed via /dev/(u)random and MD5 PRNG provides a function interface get_random_int(). While the /dev/(u)random has been investigated a lot, MD5 PRNG had been regarded as a less important one. In this paper, we demonstrate MD5 PRNG is vulnerable against a generic attack by searching entropy source in some embedded systems. In fact, once a random number is obtained, one can predict previous outputs of MD5 PRNG. Even though the RNG uses high resolution clock of microsecond unit as an entropy source, we can recover random number by reducing search space. We suggest a generic attack which the attacker just guesses entropy source at most 2 53 times. This attack can be done within 74 hours using parallel implementation with NVIDIA GeForce Titan X.
Introduction
In every cryptographic system, sensitive security parameters are generated from random number generator (RNG). Consequently, the output of RNGs should be unpredictable. However, it is hard to design and implement a secure RNG in the system. In order to acquire high quality random number, nowadays, systems use auxiliary hardware RNG or nonphysical RNG provided by operating system. We investigate RNGs in Linux kernel. It has two RNGs which can be used by kernel level processes. One is called LRNG providing /dev/(u)random and get_random_bytes() interface. The other is MD5 PRNG providing get_random_int() interface. In this paper, we will discuss the security of MD5 PRNG in detail, since LRNG has been sufficiently investigated [2, 3] .
Because MD5 PRNG is regarded as general purpose RNG in Linux kernel, only a few researcher look this RNG at the cryptographic point of view. However, The MD5 PRNG is used for generating values of Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) [4] and stack protector against buffer overflow attack a.k.a. "canary". If an output of MD5 PRNG can be predicted, the above protection methods can be useless.
In this paper, our main interest is how to attack (predict output) this RNG in practical time. In order to do that, an attacker must predict whole entropy source which was used for generating the target random number. MD5 PRNG uses two values as entropy source stored in 4-byte variable, respectively. A computational complexity for guessing seems to be 2 32 . However, because all booting processes are always equal and the system clock used in Linux kernel always starts at same point, every entropy source gets some biased distribution as compared with the uniform distribution. The computational complexity will be significantly decrease as much as degree of biases.
The structure of the remaining part of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we introduce the MD5 PRNG and its behavior. An analysis of entropy source will be considered in Section 3, in the conclusion, the summary of our result is provided and future works are suggested.
MD5 PRNG in Linux kernel
The MD5 PRNG is implemented in Linux kernel. It is a simple RNG which outputs 32-bit random number when it is called by a process in kernel. The MD5 PRNG uses 3 components: MD5 cryptographic hash function [1] as an extractor, per-CPU 128-bit hash chaining variable and a global 512-bit secret value random_int_secret generated by /dev/(u)random. The structure and behavior [5] is presented as flowing Figure 1 . In the early boot time, the 128-bit initial hash value is set to zero and the 512-bit random_int_secret are initialized to constant. Although it was generated by /dev/(u)random, the RNG outputs the constant in early boot time. It is not changed after initialization.
When a process in kernel calls the function get_random_int() at time request in Figure 1 . The MD5 PRNG do the following steps.
① Adds pid, jiffies and cycles to the first word of previous hash value. The both of jiffies and cycles values reflect current time information. ② Calculates MD5 hash value with previous hash value and random_int_secret. ③ Outputs the first word of the hash value calculated in ② to the process requested.
Entropy Source and Computational Complexity of MD5 PRNG
Since the entropy of jiffies (millisecond-precision) is negligible compared with a cycle (microsecond-precision) value, in this chapter, we discuss a cycle source. We experiment on Intel Edison board flashed Brillo which is an IoT OS made by Google, and Raspberry pi 2 model B board with Raspbian OS. The Figure 2 presents our analysis of a cycle source collected in Edison board.
Fig. 2. Capture of partial data from experiments on the Intel Edison board
In order to achieve each distribution of each , we reboot the device 10,000 times, and collect 30 cycles for each boot time. If the cycle values follow the uniform distribution, the cycle source can be regarded as a full entropy source. It means that the attacker predicting just one cycle value calculates MD5 compression function approximately 2 32 times. However, according to Figure 2 , all the have about 30,000,000 range. Furthermore, a defined as distance between and +1 , has smaller scale than each ranges. For instance, a range of the first delta located column E in Figure 2 is 154,945≒ 2 18 . An attacker trying to predict the time differences such as 1 , 1 , 2 , 3 , … has more advantage in computational complexity than others who try to predict the time stamps 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , and so on. Furthermore, every delta doesn't hold the uniform distribution. For example, in case of 1 in Figure 3 , it is widely distributed compared with its range. However, the distribution of 3 is highly biased. Although the 3 occurs ranged in 100,435≒2
17 , it really occurs ranged in less than 30,000≒2 13 . As a result, ranges of some deltas can be reduced by significant amount. 
Attack Scenario
We can consider a generic attacker which has at least one output and tries to predict entropy source. Then the attacker can acquire all previous outputs from the output he already know. For example, assuming that an attacker can acquired 3 rd output of MD5 PRNG presented in Figure 1 , he can also determine 1 st and 2 nd output through guessing 1 , 1 and 2 . A probability that the 1 occur ranged in 1,000,000 ≒ 2 20 is 0.5 and a probability that the 1 occur ranged in 90,000 is 0.8 and a probability is 0.8 in case of 2 with range 60,000. The attacker just guesses entropy source at most 2 53 times. We expect this attack can be done in 74 hours using parallel implementation using recent GPU, NVIDIA GeForce Titan X.
Furthermore, if an attacker can acquire a booting log file, above attack get easier. Since the booting process is always same and the log file has each event of time value in boot time, the attacker just guess cycles or deltas between specific lines in log file. That's why each extraction time of RNG must be located between some two adjacent events in boot time.
Conclusion
In this work, we performed the analysis of MD5 PRNG and show distributions of entropy source via collection of its entropy source. Using only time noise as entropy source, the output of this RNG is predictable through the attack introduced in chapter 4. Once a random number is compromised by attacker, one can predict previous outputs of MD5 PRNG. We are investigating whether or not the assumption can be put into practice. In detail, we are analyzing a source code of linux kernel in order that a process of user level can acquire a random number generated by MD5 PRNG in kernel level.
